Catalysts – A Summary (Part II of II)

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activist investors, Argo Group, Avangardco, binary outcomes, Carl Icahn, catalyst, Daniel Loeb, Expected Value, government regulation, Herbalife, IRR, junk bonds, litigation, major sale, NAV discount, Risk Arbitrage, Robert Chapman, share buyback, shareholder activism

Continued from here.

iv) Activist Investors are my next catalyst. Obviously, there’s no specific timetable here, but since most activists are performance-driven hedge funds, a 6 mth to 2 yr timeline is reasonable. Activists in the UK usually target asset discounts & realizations (so investment trusts/companies are ideal), while European/US activists are perhaps more biased towards operational change (which may require a longer investment horizon).

Most activists prefer to agitate for change behind the scenes, but some prefer to be more public: Carl Icahn (I read King Icahn at least once a year) is the king of the activists – he’s 77 now, but is more of top of his game today than he was 30 yrs ago! Other notorious activists (& 13D filers) are Dan Loeb of Third Point (and here, though he claims he’s mellowed now!) & Robert Chapman, who (presumably!?) introduced the first ‘fuck‘ in an SEC filing. More in-depth reading material includes ‘Risk Arbitrage‘ by Wyser-Pratte, ‘Extreme Value Hedging‘ by Orol, and certain chapters of ‘Free Capital‘ by Guy Thomas.

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How About Another Catalyst? (Part X)

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Adrian Williams, Alphameric, alternative assets, Argo Group, asset managers, Avangardco, Bear Stearns, binary outcomes, capital expenditure, catalyst, delisting risk, DM plc, Dresden, emerging markets, Expected Value, Fair Value, Fortress Investment Group, Gagfah, government regulation, intrinsic value, IRR, Joe Lewis, litigation, major sale, Net LTV, P/E ratio, P/S Ratio, risk aversion, risk management, share buyback, share repurchase, takeover offers, Timeweave

Continued from here, & here’s the first post in the series.

vi) Litigation/Regulation is the final catalyst on my list. It’s also, without a doubt, the most difficult to exploit & to write about (note I’ve tackled this series in reverse order)! In fact, if it doesn’t (immediately) appeal to you, I might perhaps discourage you from ever bothering with this catalyst? To some extent it suffers from the same issues/perceptions I highlighted with v) the Major Sale catalyst.

First, most litigation/regulation risk/events are simply part & parcel of normal corporate operating activity. For example, certain sectors are almost permanently marked down due to their increased risk level (perhaps something politicians like to mouth off about?!). These risks usually aren’t of any fresh/major significance to a company’s business model or valuation, and/or they’re routinely priced in anyway – they are not catalysts.

But occasionally a real game changer comes along… A lawsuit, or a regulatory change/threat/action/approval, that could prompt a major change in a company’s future intrinsic value. It may also cause a rapid/significant adjustment in the company’s current market cap. So how exactly do we separate out & identify such a catalyst vs. the merely hum-drum? A similar approach, like v), seems sensible – something like:

TGISVP – Hot? Not?!

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Alpha Portfolio, Barron's, Beta Portfolio, binary outcomes, Fastnet Oil & Gas, FBD Holdings, garbage stocks, intrinsic value, junior resource stocks, Leverage, Margin of Safety, Petroneft Resources, portfolio allocation, portfolio performance, risk management, Smart Alpha Portfolio, Smart Beta Portfolio, stock screener, TGISVP, Total Produce, Trinity Biotech, US Oil & Gas, value investing

In my last post, I was delighted to see the TGISVP Alpha & Beta Portfolios continue to expand their level of out-performance vs. their ISEQ benchmark. Particularly pleasing was the sight of my favourite, the Smart Alpha portfolio, far outpacing the others with a 21.1% YTD absolute return. But we’re still only 9 months into the experiment, so clearly we need a far longer horizon to confirm if this performance edge is sustainable.

It also makes me wonder if there’s a lesson to be learned here..? No, not whether value investing out-performs in the long run – I’m fully convinced of that already! [And if you’re not, please please read some of the numerous papers published on the topic]. But whether a mechanical approach is perhaps better?

Ha! No, I’m certainly not planning on becoming a stock screening convert..! But I wonder: Even if you’re a v competent & disciplined value analyst, even if you’ve conquered much of the fear & greed involved in investing, perhaps that demon mind still trips you up at that v last hurdle, or two..? When you’ve a nice stack of portfolio candidates lined up, why do you then take a shine to some & not to others? Why does one special stock really get your heart racing, far out of proportion to its obvious prospects? Why do you end up triple invested in one stock vs. another, when they both lined up pretty much even-stevens in terms of risk/reward?

2012 Baker’s Dozen – More Pie!

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Argo Group, Baker's Dozen, binary outcomes, catalyst, Foo Fighters, FTSE 100, FTSE Eurotop 100, Granville, Hamlet, hedge funds, inflation, ISEQ, junior resource stocks, Livermore Investments, performance appraisal, Petroneft Resources, portfolio allocation, portfolio performance, Richland Resources, risk management, S&P 500

Righto, another quarter’s done, time to check in on performance again. First, my Q1 and H1 performance reviews will provide you with some handy background & context. Second, it’s always fun to pose some questions before hitting the stats:

– Of the US/Europe/UK/Ireland, which do you think has had the worst year to date?

– And the best?

– So, did you predict your best stock winner year to date?

– Ever notice how much easier it is to predict your worst stock loser?

– Is there any lesson, or story, attached to your losses?

– Why has the average hedge fund under-performed so badly this year?

Well, hopefully I cover some/all of those questions here..!

AGI Therapeutics – Anatomy of a Takeover (II)

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AGI Therapeutics, binary outcomes, Gross IRR, Gross Return, intangibles, intrinsic value, John Paulson, junior resource stocks, Risk Arbitrage, Warner Chilcott, Warren Buffett

Continued from here. OK, we’ve run through the key components of the AGI Therapeutics (AGI:ID/LN) offer. You now have a pretty good idea of the terms, attractiveness, timeline and likely success of this deal. But how does it stack up from an investment perspective? Well, as I said, let’s not approach this backwards – as with any investment, no matter your excitement or conviction about the company/stock story, intrinsic valuation comes first:

AGI’s most recent balance sheet (Jun-11) is pretty simple – they’ve $9.251 mio of Cash on hand, while Net Payables of about $0.3 mio are offset by a subsequent sale of patents to Warner Chilcott (WCRX:US) for about $0.3 mio also. This sale probably wiped out some/all of the $0.241 mio in recorded Intangibles, and there’s really nothing else to the B/S. btw I tend to ignore balance sheet Goodwill/Intangibles/etc. anyway when calculating Intrinsic Value. You should be able to confirm/calculate the value of intangibles from other sources – like reserve reports, industry comps, superior/sustainable earnings etc. – if you can’t, it’s usually best to ignore these ‘assets‘ (try tell this to your average junior resource company investor, sigh…).