Mid-Year 2013 – Performance Update

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Alternative Asset Opportunities, Avangardco, checklists, CLOs, correlation, European Islamic Investment Bank, FBD Holdings, Fortress Investment Group, German property, home bias investing, KWG Kommunale Wohnen, Petroneft Resources, portfolio allocation, portfolio performance, quantitative easing, Richland Resources, risk aversion, Sirius Real Estate, Tetragon Financial Group

I remain (somewhat) uncomfortable with performance reviews. Inevitably, they produce a pretty meaningless snapshot…but we just can’t help ourselves, eh? 😉 [I covered this whole topic in greater depth here, in my 2012 Performance Review, so that may be worth another look]. OK, once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more…

Let’s first check how the indices performed in H1-2013:

The performance of Ireland & the UK nicely supports my theory that the northern periphery (inc. Scandinavia – lots of interesting stocks there right now) offers some of the best (& lower-risk) plays on Europe. Then we have the US, which continues to demonstrate how much further along it is (vs. Europe) in the cycle – as Bernanke reminded the market recently, to its (feigned?) consternation! [And to the genuine consternation of the ECB & BoE – oh boy, there’s going to be plenty of playing chicken, on all sides, in the months & year to come]. I’m profoundly suspicious of the US market now – it’s not that rising bond yields can cause much damage, they’ll obviously remain low in absolute terms for a v long time. But the market’s a discounting machine – when buying stocks gets easy & the economic outlook starts to look rosy for the average investor, that’s when things turn dangerous: Because how much of that’s already been priced in? Too many times, this scenario leaves you at break-even for a couple of years (if you’re lucky), or much worse…

And if you think this time is different – well, I actually agree, but not in a good way! There’s no free lunch – you can’t just print your way to prosperity & expect to escape scot-free, there are always (unpredictable) consequences. So, has that been priced in also..?

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Portfolio Allocation (XIII – Alternative Investments)

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activist investors, Alternative Asset Opportunities, alternative assets, Argo Group, asset managers, catalyst, CLOs, correlation, distressed investing, Event Driven, hedge fund seeding, hedge funds, hedge funds of funds, Livermore Investments Group, mortgage hedge funds, portfolio allocation, proprietary trading, Raven Russia, Tetragon Financial Group, thematic investing, volatility

Continued from here.

For now obscure reasons, this series was originally called ‘Hitting the Century‘. At this point, I’ve bowed to the inevitable & given it a more sensible name. It’s still a v leisurely stroll through the topic of portfolio allocation. I usually touch on stocks I actually own quite briefly, as the main objective is to expand on the logic (& attractions) of my specific portfolio allocation. Also, since my approach to investing is better described as thematic rather than (say) geographic, I generally highlight a selection of stocks which may exploit particular theme(s). As a reminder, here’s the allocation pie-chart I’ve used for the series:

Hedge (7%):

Hedge funds were a far larger component of my portfolio. This reflected a gradual migration over the years from open-end funds (many moons ago), to closed-end funds & investment trusts/companies, and finally into hedge funds. This was accompanied by an increasing reluctance to delegate my investing & investments. [Which may surprise you, as investment companies still play a significant role in my portfolio. However, this tends to now reflect my delegation of a specific/specialist investment theme – or simply the selection of a fund itself as an attractive investment, due to the presence of a large discount/catalyst/etc.]. Hedge funds, however, appeared to potentially offer the magic combination of lower volatility/correlation & better long-term returns. Sure, maybe they’d under-perform a bull market, but who cared – they simply ignored down markets, right?!

Tetragon – Ready To Be A Star

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alternative assets, asset managers, CLOs, hedge fund seeding, Leon Cooperman, leveraged loans, Paddy Dear, Polygon, Reade Griffith, residual equity tranches, Tetragon Financial Group, TFG

Continued from here.

The ultra-quick recap:  Leveraged loans avoid most interest-rate price risk & enjoy better (default) recoveries than junk bonds, while CLOs offer diversification & loss mitigation, plus varying levels of tranche risk. These defensive attributes, coupled with current CLO yield spreads, may offer the best credit opportunity for 2013.

I like that risk/reward profile, but honestly, current yields & potential returns from leveraged loans/most CLO tranches don’t offer the level of return I’m seeking. Yes, you know where this is going… I want to take those defensive attributes & re-invest them into a more aggressive investment – residual equity tranches!

Time now for a proper introduction:  Tetragon Financial Group (TFG:NA)

Tetragon IPO’d at $10 in 2007, as an Amsterdam listed closed-end investment company, primarily investing in US CLO residual equity tranches. Some funds & business development companies (BDCs) have recently added CLO equity exposure, but TFG’s one of the few pure plays out there. It’s managed by Tetragon Financial Management (TFM), which is controlled by the founders of Polygon Global Partners. Um, let’s just dive straight into the bad stuff…

Where’s The Credit Opportunity In 2013?

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CDOs, CLOs, Collateralized Loan Obligations, Colony Financial, Fed, income/dividend bubble, junk bonds, leveraged loans, mortgage hedge funds

Owning Colony Financial (CLNY:US) was v rewarding. I bought it as a cheap distressed assets play, but I suspect my gains actually came from income investors, who are now rushing into the stock. That got me thinking… And it hammered home a couple of lessons: a) Never under-estimate the desperation of income investors, and (more seriously) b) Don’t fight the Fed! Now, that may sound like a contrarian challenge to some – sure, sometimes it can prove v profitable to fight a rising tide.

Except surfing the big waves is simply far more rewarding most of the time. Do you really want to be the investor who faces down the Fed’s steamrolling printing press? Especially with a ravenous horde of zombie income investors chasing after it?!

But it’s becoming increasingly difficult to exploit those lessons. Look around, most yields are too low, most prices too high… Look at property REITs, mortgage REITs, MLPs, closed-end funds (esp. Pimco!), and other assorted dividend story stocks. Most are now sporting fairly nauseating valuations & leverage – while the dregs are simply Ponzi schemes, relentlessly issuing stock & debt to fund excessive dividends. But what’s the alternative – Treasuries?! Oh please, just stab me with a rusty fork.

Livermore Investments (I)

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activist investors, Baker's Dozen, CLOs, closed-end funds, delisting risk, Everest Capital, intrinsic value, investment companies, Leverage, Livermore Investments, NAV discount, Net LTV, Owner-Operator, principal-agent problem, private equity funds, real estate, safe-havens, share buyback, TER

Livermore Investments Group Ltd. (LIV:LN) is one of my 2012 Baker’s Dozen stock picks. And doing v nicely too…up +79% YTD! This post isn’t just specifically about Livermore – LIV also offers great perspective on owner-operators, share buybacks & shareholder value. Oh, and – shhh, draw the blinds – I’ll whisper it: De-listings...

LIV is a London-listed (closed-end) investment company. Its portfolio is focused on 3 different investment areas:

i) Real Estate:   The major holding is $38.2 mio (net of related debt) invested in Wyler Park, a commercial/residential Swiss property. It’s fully let, on a gross 5.1% rental yield, with development potential for another 37% of floor space. The other significant investment is $14.7 mio of convertible debt in SRS Charminar, an Indian real estate company. Unfortunately, the stake’s been subject to long-running litigation. But with ample initial over-collateralization, and an agreed settlement this year, continuing uncertainty’s now hopefully related to timing & expenses, rather than recovery value. Net of interest rate swaps, total net property investment is $45.9 mio, or about 32% of NAV.