Catalysts – A Summary (Part I of II)

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Alternative Asset Opportunities, asset allocation, catalyst, correlation, dividend tax treatment, Event Driven, Expected Value, fighting the Fed, Investegate, IRR, Liquidations, Margin of Safety, offer premium, portfolio allocation, QE, Recommended Cash Offer, Risk Arbitrage, risk-on risk-off, takeover offers, Takeover Panel, VIX, volatility, wind-down

My 10-part series on catalysts last year (stretching from Jan to Dec!) was well received, judging by the readership & links. I vaguely promised a summary to wrap up the series – as we’re well into the new year (already?!), it now seems appropriate to deliver that post (& hopefully it proves useful).

By the end of last summer, I concluded there’s little point fighting the Fed… A fortunate decision, as the market’s been decidedly risk-on since then! Though I must say, the power of central bank liquidity still surprises me. If you recall, last summer, we appeared to face a pretty bleak outlook both sides of the Atlantic: The fiscal cliff in the US & the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. [Hmmph, different stories…same destination!] Personally, I considered the cliff to be just like those periodic kerfuffles over the US debt ceiling – no genuine threat, but divisive political rhetoric could certainly roil the markets (& perhaps prompt a rating-agency response). On the other hand, the European crisis…er, what happened, where the hell did that go..?!

This risk-on attitude’s left my portfolio light on investments with shorter-term/lower-risk catalysts (i.e. event-driven investments). However, I still strive to pick new investments which (ideally) possess at least one longer-term/higher-risk catalyst. That type of catalyst doesn’t necessarily mean you avoid downside risk, but hopefully it stacks the deck in your favour vs. what the average value investment (complete with margin of safety) might offer. It may also accelerate the time-line for a stock’s realization of its intrinsic value/upside potential. Anyway, much of my event-driven exposure was ultimately re-invested in Alternative Asset Opportunities (TLI:LN) – so I simply exchanged a low return/relatively uncorrelated risk for a cheap/high return/totally uncorrelated risk! Go on, you might want to give it a try..! 🙂

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Chasing Some Dividend Tail (III)..?

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Autozone, Bernie Madoff, Big Ang, Character Group, dividend coverage, dividend yield, enhanced EPS/NAV, gold, income/dividend bubble, investment companies, JAKKS Pacific, Liquidations, Livermore Investments, M&A, share buyback, tender offer, trading sardines, wind-down

Continued from here. OK, so dividends kinda suck…but what’s the alternative? Well, let’s tackle that from the corporate perspective first:

– Obviously, share buybacks (and/or tenders & capital returns) are generally a far more tax-efficient means of distribution to shareholders. They enhance earnings, or significantly increase NAV/book value. [Just look at the amazing run on Autozone (AZO:US) – yes, they’ve had great execution, but much of its performance is down to aggressive/sustained stock buybacks]. It also permits management to be far smarter & more opportunistic in their distributions, and their response to share price volatility.

– Just as important, it frees management of the potentially absurd strait-jacket of maintaining an inappropriate dividend – which, in extremis, leads to management idiotically borrowing just to fund a (tax-inefficient) dividend. On occasion, this is exactly the point where management tips over from ‘gently deceiving‘ shareholders into downright criminal/accounting fraud…

Seduction…and Neglect?! How About a Catalyst? (Part III)

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Avanti Capital, delisting risk, Dhir India, Eurovestech, GPG, Gresham House, IRR, JSM Indochina, Liquidations, LMS Capital, Mazars, Ottoman Fund, Private Equity Investor, Siteserv, South African Property Opps, Spark Ventures, Trading Emissions, Trinity Capital, Veris plc, wind-down

Continued from here:

i) Liquidations are top of the heap for catalysts! They’re usually only announced after a company has sold all/the majority of its assets (or occasionally its business(es)). They offer the best prospect of a highly certain final asset value, to be realized within a reasonably short/well-defined timeline. They’re usually concluded within 6 months to 2 years, and any decent BoD/management will provide an estimated total distribution amount (net of all expected liquidation expenses) and schedule.

Of course, if they’ve an ounce of sense, they’ll be as conservative/pessimistic as possible with their forecasts, so any surprises should hopefully be positive… (In fact, they should recast the B/S with all future expected liquidation expenses included as a provision – i.e. accounting on a liquidation basis, not a going concern basis). In aggregate, these features mean that liquidations have v attractive IRRs and Expected Value Returns!