A Letter to Avangardco (AVGR:LN)

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accretion, activist investors, Avangardco, Cal-Maine Foods, corporate governance, eggs, enhanced EPS/NAV, free cash flow, intrinsic value, Iryna Marchenko, lowest cost producer, M&A, majority control, minorities, Nataliya Vasylyuk, Oleg Bakhmatyuk, P/E ratio, P/S Ratio, Return on Equity, risk aversion, share buyback, technical analysis, Ukraine, Ukrlandfarming

Here’s a copy of a recent letter to the CEO & CFO of Avangardco.

Note I’ve updated all figures, as appropriate, to reflect today’s $10.50 closing price – otherwise, the text remains unchanged. For reference, I’ll also include Word copies of the original below. The letter speaks for itself, and is also a great reminder to readers of AVGR‘s extraordinarily cheap valuation! So, without further ado:

‘November 05, 2012

FAO:

Nataliya Vasylyuk, CEO, &

Iryna Marchenko, CFO

Avangardco IPL

121 V Prospect Peremohy

Kyiv, 03115

Ukraine

Dear Nataliya & Iryna,

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How About Another Catalyst? (Part X)

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Adrian Williams, Alphameric, alternative assets, Argo Group, asset managers, Avangardco, Bear Stearns, binary outcomes, capital expenditure, catalyst, delisting risk, DM plc, Dresden, emerging markets, Expected Value, Fair Value, Fortress Investment Group, Gagfah, government regulation, intrinsic value, IRR, Joe Lewis, litigation, major sale, Net LTV, P/E ratio, P/S Ratio, risk aversion, risk management, share buyback, share repurchase, takeover offers, Timeweave

Continued from here, & here’s the first post in the series.

vi) Litigation/Regulation is the final catalyst on my list. It’s also, without a doubt, the most difficult to exploit & to write about (note I’ve tackled this series in reverse order)! In fact, if it doesn’t (immediately) appeal to you, I might perhaps discourage you from ever bothering with this catalyst? To some extent it suffers from the same issues/perceptions I highlighted with v) the Major Sale catalyst.

First, most litigation/regulation risk/events are simply part & parcel of normal corporate operating activity. For example, certain sectors are almost permanently marked down due to their increased risk level (perhaps something politicians like to mouth off about?!). These risks usually aren’t of any fresh/major significance to a company’s business model or valuation, and/or they’re routinely priced in anyway – they are not catalysts.

But occasionally a real game changer comes along… A lawsuit, or a regulatory change/threat/action/approval, that could prompt a major change in a company’s future intrinsic value. It may also cause a rapid/significant adjustment in the company’s current market cap. So how exactly do we separate out & identify such a catalyst vs. the merely hum-drum? A similar approach, like v), seems sensible – something like:

A Game of Chicken

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adjusted earnings, annual reports, blind stock valuation, bloggers, chickens, exceptionals, gypsies, intrinsic value, P/E ratio, Warren Buffett

OK, perhaps it’s time I jump on the blind stock valuation bandwagon – there’s been some good posts/responses out there recently in that vein. I’ve noticed some issues, though, with this challenge approach:  First, a blind stock valuation where nobody turns out to own the stock seems like a v sterile exercise to me. Let me just tell you now: I do own this stock, it’s v bloody interesting, and I promise I’ll be telling you more about it soon..!

So please make sure to post/email your valuation/comments asap – all great encouragement for me to get on with a write-up!

Second, reading some of the challenges, I feel like there’s been some (understandable) confusion, on all sides. Some readers state, for example, a stock’s worth $20 but they wouldn’t pay more than $10 for it. Others peg the value of another stock at $40, but highlight the market would probably pay $80. Others give a range of values. And so on… All these seem a little off-base to me – particularly in the context of a blind stock valuation.

Hitting The Century (III)

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Argo Group, Avangardco, dividend coverage, dividend yield, EIIB, Ex-Cash Ratios, FBD Holdings, Net LTV, P/E ratio, Petroneft Resources, portfolio allocation, portfolio performance, Price/Book, Price/Sales, TGISVP, Total Produce, Trinity Biotech, Wordpress

Damn WordPress! If you viewed/received a similar Century (Part III) post (since deleted), please ignore it – it was just a draft & I’ve updated/revised figures across the board since. Not quite sure how WordPress managed to publish it for me..!

Right, continued from here. In my last post I promised: ‘OK, next I’ll take you through each of my investment allocations – and try to give a flavour of my thinking, and some underlying stocks/funds, in each instance‘. However, I’ve just completed a detailed quarter-end portfolio update/review, so let’s flip things ’round – perhaps you’d be interested in a timely look at some portfolio metrics¹, and we’ll return to investment allocations in my next post?

Yes, really? So you like the pretty panties, but you still want to know the damn cost..?! Sigh, value investors..! OK:

Asset Managers – Another Look at Valuation

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% of AUM, activist investors, alternative assets, asset managers, catalyst, earnings growth, Goldman Sachs, hedge funds, P/B Ratio, P/E ratio, P/S Ratio, Price/Sales, REIT/MLP sector, short sellers, takeover offers

Continued from here. I was glad to see some comments/debate come back to me re my previous asset manager valuation statement:

‘Obviously each manager has their own unique story/valuation, but big picture these metrics really work: 2.25%-3.25% of AUM for traditional managers and 7.5%+ of AUM for alternative managers.‘

‘Big picture‘, of course, just means on average & over time, there will be plenty of exceptions to the rule..! Actually, readers were really just (smartly) anticipating something I wanted to highlight in my Part 2: I’ve highlighted the benefits/logic of using a % of AUM valuation approach, but how about related risks & questions? Like: