Mid-Year 2013 – Performance Update

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Alternative Asset Opportunities, Avangardco, checklists, CLOs, correlation, European Islamic Investment Bank, FBD Holdings, Fortress Investment Group, German property, home bias investing, KWG Kommunale Wohnen, Petroneft Resources, portfolio allocation, portfolio performance, quantitative easing, Richland Resources, risk aversion, Sirius Real Estate, Tetragon Financial Group

I remain (somewhat) uncomfortable with performance reviews. Inevitably, they produce a pretty meaningless snapshot…but we just can’t help ourselves, eh? 😉 [I covered this whole topic in greater depth here, in my 2012 Performance Review, so that may be worth another look]. OK, once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more…

Let’s first check how the indices performed in H1-2013:

The performance of Ireland & the UK nicely supports my theory that the northern periphery (inc. Scandinavia – lots of interesting stocks there right now) offers some of the best (& lower-risk) plays on Europe. Then we have the US, which continues to demonstrate how much further along it is (vs. Europe) in the cycle – as Bernanke reminded the market recently, to its (feigned?) consternation! [And to the genuine consternation of the ECB & BoE – oh boy, there’s going to be plenty of playing chicken, on all sides, in the months & year to come]. I’m profoundly suspicious of the US market now – it’s not that rising bond yields can cause much damage, they’ll obviously remain low in absolute terms for a v long time. But the market’s a discounting machine – when buying stocks gets easy & the economic outlook starts to look rosy for the average investor, that’s when things turn dangerous: Because how much of that’s already been priced in? Too many times, this scenario leaves you at break-even for a couple of years (if you’re lucky), or much worse…

And if you think this time is different – well, I actually agree, but not in a good way! There’s no free lunch – you can’t just print your way to prosperity & expect to escape scot-free, there are always (unpredictable) consequences. So, has that been priced in also..?

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A Letter to Avangardco (AVGR:LN)

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accretion, activist investors, Avangardco, Cal-Maine Foods, corporate governance, eggs, enhanced EPS/NAV, free cash flow, intrinsic value, Iryna Marchenko, lowest cost producer, M&A, majority control, minorities, Nataliya Vasylyuk, Oleg Bakhmatyuk, P/E ratio, P/S Ratio, Return on Equity, risk aversion, share buyback, technical analysis, Ukraine, Ukrlandfarming

Here’s a copy of a recent letter to the CEO & CFO of Avangardco.

Note I’ve updated all figures, as appropriate, to reflect today’s $10.50 closing price – otherwise, the text remains unchanged. For reference, I’ll also include Word copies of the original below. The letter speaks for itself, and is also a great reminder to readers of AVGR‘s extraordinarily cheap valuation! So, without further ado:

‘November 05, 2012

FAO:

Nataliya Vasylyuk, CEO, &

Iryna Marchenko, CFO

Avangardco IPL

121 V Prospect Peremohy

Kyiv, 03115

Ukraine

Dear Nataliya & Iryna,

How About Another Catalyst? (Part X)

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Adrian Williams, Alphameric, alternative assets, Argo Group, asset managers, Avangardco, Bear Stearns, binary outcomes, capital expenditure, catalyst, delisting risk, DM plc, Dresden, emerging markets, Expected Value, Fair Value, Fortress Investment Group, Gagfah, government regulation, intrinsic value, IRR, Joe Lewis, litigation, major sale, Net LTV, P/E ratio, P/S Ratio, risk aversion, risk management, share buyback, share repurchase, takeover offers, Timeweave

Continued from here, & here’s the first post in the series.

vi) Litigation/Regulation is the final catalyst on my list. It’s also, without a doubt, the most difficult to exploit & to write about (note I’ve tackled this series in reverse order)! In fact, if it doesn’t (immediately) appeal to you, I might perhaps discourage you from ever bothering with this catalyst? To some extent it suffers from the same issues/perceptions I highlighted with v) the Major Sale catalyst.

First, most litigation/regulation risk/events are simply part & parcel of normal corporate operating activity. For example, certain sectors are almost permanently marked down due to their increased risk level (perhaps something politicians like to mouth off about?!). These risks usually aren’t of any fresh/major significance to a company’s business model or valuation, and/or they’re routinely priced in anyway – they are not catalysts.

But occasionally a real game changer comes along… A lawsuit, or a regulatory change/threat/action/approval, that could prompt a major change in a company’s future intrinsic value. It may also cause a rapid/significant adjustment in the company’s current market cap. So how exactly do we separate out & identify such a catalyst vs. the merely hum-drum? A similar approach, like v), seems sensible – something like:

So, Where’s The Bloody Inflation..?!

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baby boomers, banks, Bernanke, budget deficit, capital ratios, de-leveraging, debt monetization, Debt/GDP Ratio, ECB, Europe, European sovereign debt crisis, Fed, financial crisis, fiscal deficits, Flub-Med, GDP growth, Hunt brothers, income/dividend bubble, inflation, Japan, multiplier effect, Occupy Wall Street, politicians, quantitative easing, real assets, risk aversion, savings rate, stagflation, US, Volcker

I was beginning a new post in my recent Hitting the Century series (and here), and realized my next 3 investment allocations were to real assets – Natural Resources, Agri & Property. This v quickly got me thinking about inflation, enough to devote myself to this post instead:

Along the way, dear reader, you may have noticed my pronounced distaste for fiscal & monetary policy in the developed world. Particularly in the US... That’s not intended to be a US slap-down…and certainly not praise for Europe either! It’s simply a pretty inescapable conclusion if you compare the US & (the hard-core of) Europe over the past 4 decades. Jesus, I struggle to think of somebody with any real power in the US who truly gives a flying f**k about their accelerating debt burden, debt monetization, or the long-term external value of the dollar. In contrast, the ECB & certain Eurozone countries still actually exhibit a painful reluctance to take that road to monetary & fiscal oblivion – even in the face of a European sovereign debt crisis!